Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities

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November 1993

Volume 7, Issue 4, pp. 201-272

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Editor's Note

Kenneth L. Carper, Editor

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 201 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(201) (3 pages)

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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Fatigue Damage to Steel Bridge Diaphragms

Farrel J. Zwerneman, Member, ASCE, Adam B. West, Associate Member, ASCE, and Kee S. Lim

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 207 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(207) (18 pages) | Cited 2 times

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The cause of diaphragm cracking on an interstate highway bridge is investigated. The investigation consists of load‐testing the bridge, performing a finite element analysis of the diaphragm, and conducting fatigue tests on simulated diaphragms. It is determined that a high degree of restraint at the diaphragm‐to‐girder connection causes individual diaphragms at each transverse location to act as continuous members reaching from one side of the bridge to the other. Differential deflections of longitudinal members induce moments in the diaphragms, resulting in tensile stresses along the bottom of the diaphragms. These tensile stresses are amplified by the presence of a bottom‐flange cope at the diaphragm‐to‐girder connections. High tensile stresses lead to initiation of fatigue cracks in diaphragms at copes. Repair techniques tested include smoothing the cope, reducing restraint in the connection by removing bolts from the connection, and replacing coped diaphragms with uncoped diaphragms. The technique of removing bolts from the connection is recommended for implementation.

Common Causes of Collapse of Metal‐Plate—Connected Wood Roof Trusses

Harvey A. Kagan, Fellow, ASCE

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 225 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(225) (10 pages) | Cited 1 time

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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Metal‐plate‐connected wood roof trusses are a popular structural system for light‐framed structures. They are extremely flexible and unstable until set in place and adequately braced. Though truss‐plate manufacturers have developed handling and bracing recommendations, many truss installers ignore these guidelines. This paper discusses three roof‐truss collapses that the writer has investigated and points out how the failure to properly brace the trusses is a common source of collapse. In one case, a collapse occurred twice during the truss erection. In another case, collapse occurred six years after completion. In a third case, mishandling of trusses during erection was also a contributing factor. In these cases, design and erection responsibilities were in the hands of the construction contractor. It is suggested that building‐code changes are needed to ensure that there is a rational bracing plan detailed for the use of the truss installer.

Earthquake Damage Lessons from Big Bear Lake, California, 1992

Robin Shepherd, Fellow, ASCE

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 235 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(235) (14 pages)

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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Apart from the anticipated damage to unreinforced stone and masonry chimneys, some disturbing results were observed in the June 28, 1992 earthquakes; namely, the unsatisfactory performance of recently built residential structures, some of which were clearly deficient, despite being subject to code‐enforcement procedures, and others that were in substantial compliance with the building codes. The fact that building standards, as reflected in the codes, have been subjected to stepwise developments over the last 60 years has produced a stock of buildings that possess a range of seismic resistance. However, it would be expected that, in general, the newer structures would perform better than the older ones. Experience in the Big Bear Lake area has shown departure from this pattern in several categories. One comprises buildings that failed prematurely, almost certainly as a result of negligent construction. A second includes buildings where failure appears to have been brought about by deficiencies that the codes do not address. Recent case studies are used to illustrate these disturbing facts.

The Silver Bridge Collapse Recounted

Abba G. Lichtenstein, Honorary Member, ASCE

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 249 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(249) (13 pages) | Cited 3 times

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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The bridge spanning the Ohio River between Point Pleasant, W. Va., and Gallipolis, Ohio, known as the Silver Bridge, was designed and built during 1927–28. It was the first eyebar suspension bridge in the United States, and it received much attention for making engineering history. After some 40 years of service, the bridge collapsed without warning on December 15, 1967 during the evening rush hour, when the bridge was crowded with heavy traffic. The collapse resulted in the loss of 46 lives and nine injuries. A thorough investigation revealed that the collapse of the bridge was caused by the failure of the north eyebar of the north chain at the first panel point west of the Ohio tower. The eyebar had developed a cleavage failure at the lower position of its head. The tragedy of this bridge failure led to the approval of the 1968 National Bridge Inspection Standards by the U.S. Congress.
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Surficial Slope Failure: A Case Study

Robert W. Day, Fellow, ASCE

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 264 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(264) (6 pages) | Cited 7 times

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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In a recent surficial slope failure in a compacted silty sand fill slope it was observed that the failure plane had developed just beneath the bottom of the grass roots. Results of drained direct shear tests performed at low normal stresses indicated that root‐permeated fill had a much higher shear strength than the same root‐free soil. The results of surficial stability analyses showed that live roots will significantly increase the factor of safety. The live roots provided mechanical reinforcement of the slope and thus the failure surface developed beneath the bottom of the roots. Although a factor of safety of 1.5 is generally the minimum value for new construction, a lower factor of safety may be acceptable in recognition that deep‐rooting plants will increase the long‐term surficial stability of a slope.
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Construction Claims: Prevention and Resolution, 2nd Ed.

Robert A. Rubin, Author, Virginia Fairweather, Author, Sammie D. Guy, Author, Alfred C. Maevis, Author, and Kenneth L. Carper, Reviewer, Member, ASCE

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 270 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(270) (1 page)

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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Reviewers of the Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 7, 271 (1993); http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:4(271) (2 pages)

Online Publication Date: 24 March 2006

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