Abstract

Procurement practices are often characterized by competitive tendering. The overarching purpose of this is to ingrain transparency, probity, and value for money into the processes of acquiring goods and services. When tenderers collude and clients are unable to detect them, bids will become uncompetitive. Yet, there have been a limited number of effective practical tools and methods developed that can be used by procurement authorities, controllers, and public officials to detect collusive tendering. Using data obtained from the Brazilian Federal Police and their ongoing criminal investigation titled Operation Car Wash, a robust and practical probabilistic method is developed. The main findings were that the method was able to accurately identify (81%–96%) the occurrence of collusion during a sealed tendering process. Conclusions are drawn from the lessons learned from the forensic investigations, indicating that the approach presented for detecting collusive behavior during tendering is grounded in reality. This paper presents a new way to utilize statistics and probability to identify the presence of and control collusion in public- and private-sector tendering.

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Data Availability Statement

Data generated or analyzed during the study are available from the corresponding author by request. Information about the Journal’s data-sharing policy can be found here: https://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001263.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the Brazilian Federal Police and Curtin University for supporting the strengthening of scientific evidence.

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Go to Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 146Issue 1January 2020

History

Received: Dec 19, 2018
Accepted: May 13, 2019
Published online: Oct 18, 2019
Published in print: Jan 1, 2020
Discussion open until: Mar 18, 2020

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Forensic Engineer, Technical and Scientific Sector, Brazilian Federal Police, Rua Paschoal Apostolo Pitsica, 4744, Florianopolis, SC 88025-255, Brazil. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5813-7128. Email: [email protected]
John Curtin Distinguished Professor, School of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, Curtin Univ., G.P.O. Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia (corresponding author). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3239-1304. Email: [email protected]
Alexanders T. N. Belarmino, Ph.D. [email protected]
Forensic Expert, Head of the Technical and Scientific Sector, Brazilian Federal Police, Rua Paschoal Apostolo Pitsica, 4744, Florianopolis, SC 88025-255, Brazil. Email: [email protected]
Oluwole Alfred Olatunji, Ph.D. [email protected]
Senior Lecturer, Head of the School of Design and the Built Environment, Curtin Univ., G.P.O. Box U1987, Perth, WA 5845, Australia. Email: [email protected]

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